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In this article the author examines public schools in the United States as 
sites where immigrants and refugees express their religious identities as 
part of their integration processes. In particular, the author examines the 
schools as “sites of refuge” for refugee students. Although public schools 
provide refugees with opportunity for study without regard to race, religion, 
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion (areas 
of potential persecution under the 1951 UN Convention Regarding the Status 
of Refugees), owing to their liberal and secular nature they necessarily put 
constraints on the degree to which students may exercise their particularistic 
cultural identities. Religion is an area in which such constraints are often 
most apparent. The article analyzes Will Kymlicka’s theory of polyethnic 
group rights as a possible framework for both understanding migrant ethnic 
cultures and integration processes generally, as well as a defense for providing 
accommodations for the religious identities and religious expressions of 
immigrant and refugee students. With conditions, the author believes that, by 
guaranteeing the right to refugee students’ societal culture, polyethnic rights 
comprise a viable framework for supporting immigrants and refugees in their 
integration into the United States. However, the framework works only to 
the degree that it is consistent with and advances liberal ends, including 
student autonomy and freedom.
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While public schools in the United States provide refugees with opportunity 
for study without regard to race, religion, nationality, membership of a particu-
lar social group or political opinion (areas of potential persecution under the 
1951 UN Convention Regarding the Status of Refugees), owing to their liberal 
and secular nature they necessarily put constraints on the degree to which stu-
dents may exercise their particularistic cultural identities (Cambron-McCabe, 
McCarthy, & Thomas, 2004; United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
[UNHCR], 2000). Religion is an area in which such constraints are often most 
apparent. This article examines challenges and issues that migrants face in 
exercising their religious identities in public schools and focuses specifically 
on refugees as a unique case, both with respect to the manner in which they 
enter the United States and the degree to which religiosity factors into their 
integration processes. These challenges and issues reflect questions of funda-
mental concern to liberals and are brought into sharper focus through an ana-
lytical framework drawn from contemporary liberalism.
Working from the above, in the first part of the article I discuss some 
major issues facing migrants in expressing their religious identities in the 
public schools and then move to examining refugees as a unique migrant 
group. I follow this with a discussion of the role of religion in migrant inte-
gration processes. In the second part of the article I focus on a stream of 
contemporary liberal thought particularly attentive to theories of self that 
include rather than exclude cultural membership as an important (though not 
necessarily fixed) constituent part. Specifically, I examine Will Kymlicka’s 
theory of polyethnic group rights as a framework for both understanding 
migrant ethnic cultures and integration processes generally, and as a possible 
liberal defense for providing accommodations for the religious identities and 
expressions of migrant students. In keeping with the article’s theme, I further 
analyze Kymlicka’s framework as a viable construct for examination of refu-
gees and their religious expression in the schools.
The article employs Castles and Millers’ (2003) terminology to differenti-
ate between “immigrants” and “refugees.” First, the word migrant is used as 
a comprehensive category to refer to one who moves from one country to 
another. A “voluntary migrant,” or “immigrant,” is one who elects to migrate 
to a different country, usually for economic or family resettlement reasons, or 
both. An “involuntary migrant,” or “refugee,” is one who is forced to leave 
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his or her home country and who either is unable or unwilling to return. As 
Castles and Miller note, however, the difference between “voluntary” and 
“involuntary” is not always easy to draw, and certainly one may have experi-
enced elements of both (many immigrants may have had experiences of 
involuntary migration in their pasts, and vice versa). I try to remain sensitive 
to this nuance throughout the work.
For his part, Will Kymlicka employs the terms immigrant and refugee 
(and not the term migrant) in his discussion of polyethnicity and polyethnic 
group rights. His discussion of these constructs is most fully born out in his 
1996 book, Multicultural Citizenship. One of the chief aims of the work is to 
reconceptualize whether group-based rights in all cases threaten liberalism’s 
core commitment to individual freedom and to individual rights and whether 
pluralism threatens social cohesion and national identity. Polyethnic rights 
comprise one of three group-differentiated rights frameworks discussed in 
the work (the other two being self-government rights and special representa-
tion rights) and refer to rights meant to help ethnic and religious minorities 
express their cultural particularity without such expression acting as a barrier 
to their successful integration into society.1
Kymlicka’s rationale for extending polyethnic rights to ethnic and reli-
gious minorities as a liberal response rests most fundamentally on protecting 
freedom. He argues that ensuring an ethnic minority groups’ equal and secure 
access to their societal culture means providing them with a viable context of 
choice. Such rights are liberal rather than illiberal, as freedom of choice is 
dependent on shared cultural meanings, social practices, and language. 
However, Kymlicka also recognizes that enabling integration involves pro-
viding equal access to mainstream culture, through such things as the provi-
sion of language training and fighting patterns of discrimination and 
prejudice. Yet the route toward ensuring common rights of citizenship cannot 
be coherently argued through asserting a conception of universal individual 
rights prefaced on the idea that cultural differences are “already” accommo-
dated due to of freedom of association. This is because the state unavoidably 
promotes certain cultural identities and thereby disadvantages others (for 
instance, English as the dominant language or work weeks scheduled around 
the Christian calendar). To promote their stability in the face of the possible 
inequalities resulting from this, Kymlicka advances that a liberal view 
requires equality between minority and majority groups (or “external protec-
tions”). At the same time, a liberal view also requires freedom within the 
minority group or a guarantee that individuals’ basic civil or political liberties 
are not restricted by their own group members. With conditions, I believe 
that, by guaranteeing the right to their societal culture, Kymlicka’s argument 
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for polyethnic rights comprises a viable framework for supporting immi-
grants as well as refugees in their integration into the United States. However, 
the framework works here only to the degree that it is consistent with and 
advances liberal ends, most notably individual freedom and autonomy.
A note about method. The aim and scope of this project necessarily draws 
upon some very broad and distinct areas of inquiry, and pulling them together 
increases its vulnerability to such issues as oversimplification, conceptual 
conflation, and spurious reasoning. Hence, it is important at the onset to 
address the article’s limitations, namely, that it is neither a legal analysis of 
refugee policy nor church–state relations, that it provides a focused examina-
tion of a particular stream in liberal thought, and, as noted above, though the 
article highlights the case of refugees, the points derived more broadly apply 
to a range of migrant groups and “types.” Finally, inasmuch as the article 
observes and analyzes religion and religiosity among migrants, it does not 
assume religion to be a necessary or even essential component of one’s iden-
tity. Recognizing the article’s vulnerabilities and defining its limitations, 
however, does not preclude discussion of interrelationships across the areas 
discussed, and indeed it is through thoughtful and rational consideration of 
their mutual connections that the purpose of the article is fully realized.
Migrant Minority Religions and U.S. Public Schools
Religious diversity in the United States is nothing new and indeed played an 
integral role in the very founding of the republic. Yet the spread of religious 
diversity in the country, in terms of numbers and types of religions, is a phenom-
enon unique to the past 40 years. For instance, commenting on data from the 
General Social Survey administered by the National Opinion Research Center, 
Portes and Rumbaut observe that between 1972 and 2002 there occurred a nota-
ble increase in the number of non-Christian religions in the United States, spe-
cifically Buddhism, Hinduism, and Islam. Furthermore, Pew Research Center’s 
U.S. Religious Landscape Survey found that religious affiliation in the United 
States was both very diverse as well as extremely fluid (Pew Research Center, 
2008). Yet two fundamental (and related) problems apparent in the literature 
caution against immediately associating this new religious diversity with a 
greater spirit of democratic pluralism and openness in the public schools. First, 
despite the new religious diversity, the United States still remains an over-
whelmingly Christian nation (Portes & Rumbaut, 2006), and Christians have 
been able to influence policy making in U.S. schools in ways that religious 
minorities have not (Cambron-McCabe et al., 2004). This has been a particu-
larly important matter regarding church–state relations in the schools, as courts 
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have shown considerable deference to legislatures and individual school boards 
in educational matters (Cambron-McCabe et al., 2004). Second, even where 
controls are taken for what is recognized or perceived as an undue influence of 
a dominant religion, the idea that public schools may somehow be “neutral” 
with respect to culture faces some rather daunting challenges, not only with 
respect to such basic things as language and dress codes but also public holi-
days, and even the definition of the school week itself (Kymlicka, 1995).
The above two problems, which I discuss in greater detail further on, are 
intimately connected to at least four broad issue areas that migrants possess-
ing and expressing minority religions face in the public schools. First, migrants 
may suffer from a lack of understanding of their particular faith background 
from not only their teachers and the school administrative and leadership staff 
but also their peers. For instance, Subedi noted that the majority of U.S. teach-
ers are White, middle-class, and “disconnected from the lives of communities 
of color” (p. 228) and that White teachers’ limited knowledge of the histories 
and experiences of students of color impedes their “ability to work with 
diverse populations in schools” (p. 228). In her own research on the matter, 
Subedi found resistance to recognizing discourses on religion among preser-
vice teachers, particularly when religious issues interconnected with topics 
concerning gender and race. Her findings corroborate other work demonstrat-
ing that preservice teachers, when confronted with diverse topics, often resist 
new knowledge (Milner, 2003) as well as studies suggesting that the majority 
of working teachers refrain from questioning the structural contexts of school 
cultures (Bell, 2002; Sleeter, 1993; Subedi, 2006). Ahmad and Szpara’s study 
of Muslim migrant children in New York illustrates and adds to the above 
points. Drawing from in-depth interviews conducted with Muslim children in 
Queens, the authors conclude that the students did not believe their classmates 
nor their teachers understood Islam and did not believe their peers and teach-
ers effectively drew distinctions between Islam as a practice “and the cultural 
differences of Muslims at large” (p. 298). Furthermore, the interviewees 
believed that misperceptions and negative stereotypes about Islam and Muslim 
values were “pervasive” in schools and that such misperceptions and stereo-
types had affected them (Ahmad & Szpara, 2003; Sleeter 2001).
Closely tied to a lack of understanding diverse faith backgrounds is a denial 
of migrant minority religions and cultures. Most dramatically, this involves cases 
of denying minority religion migrant students the right to express their religious 
identities through wearing specific dress and/or their right to practice their faith 
through prayer, observation of dietary restrictions, or other related matters, even 
where such rights are protected by the Free Exercise Clause. There is growing 
body of scholarship addressing problems of racism, ethnocentricism, and 
 at OhioLink on November 6, 2014epx.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
194  Educational Policy 24(1)
xenophobia directed against Muslim migrants students (Abu El-Haj, 2002; 
Ahmad & Szpara, 2003; Amad, 2003; Haynes, 1998; Hodge, 2002; Merry, 
2007; Sarroub, 2005) and many recent cases involving denial of religion pertain 
to Muslim migrant students in the schools (Ahmad & Szpara, 2003; Marshall, 
2006). However, others have involved different minority religions. For instance, 
Casey (2008) documented the 1995 refusal of the California Livingston School 
District to allow three young Khalsa Sikh children to wear their “kirpans” or 
ceremonial knives on the grounds that the symbols violated school policy, and a 
California statute making it a crime to carry knives over a certain size on school 
property. The kirpan constitutes one of five symbols of the Sikh faith, and it is 
required wear for observant Sikh males. The case was brought before the Ninth 
Circuit court, which ruled in favor of the children, conditional upon their address-
ing certain school safety concerns.
The official school curriculum also serves as an effective gauge in assess-
ing inattention or insensitivity to minority religions, and by extension, an 
instrument of power for maintaining unequal power relations between groups. 
As Apple (1995) forcefully asserted, the official curriculum advances what 
counts as “legitimate” knowledge, which in turn influences interpretation of 
what counts as “real.” And privileging dominant perspectives in the curricu-
lum may well negatively influence the identities of students coming from his-
torically underrepresented groups (Sarroub, 2005). For instance, Loewen 
(1995) asserts that precisely because of controversy associated with religion, 
American history textbooks tend to omit discussion of the topic altogether. As 
has been the case through much of the history of American schooling, the cur-
riculum can also be a conduit for the assertion of the dominant religion. For 
instance, there has been political activity at the school district and state levels 
pertaining to teaching evolution and alternative theories in no less than 40 
states. In one such case, in 1999 the Kansas State Board of Education actually 
rejected proposed science standards emphasizing evolution and, instead, 
adopted an alternative set that eliminated a requirement that local school dis-
tricts teach or test students about evolution (Cambron-McCabe et al., 2004).2
A third broad area concerns problems migrants experience due to a highly 
individualistic orientation toward student identity at the expense of more col-
lectivist orientations. For instance, Gibson (1998) detailed how Sikh high 
school students faced problems in negotiating a school culture that empha-
sized individual self-expression and individual reward systems rather than a 
communal sense of being. Generally, what is critical to note here is that reli-
gion is very often expressed as a group and communal activity among many 
newly arrived migrants (Portes & Rumbaut, 2006). As discussed later, this 
particular phenomenon speaks to a very deep issue concerning liberal ends.
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A final problem area concerns the risk of a static rather than dynamic treat-
ment of culture in U.S. public schools, most notably in the curriculum. This 
area is unique in that it is not so much about either a misunderstanding or 
denial of migrant minority religions but rather about framing the notion of 
culture itself. Principally, the issue concerns the problem of essentializing 
minority cultures, where such representations are treated only at a superficial 
level, or “added” to the curriculum without actually changing its core struc-
ture, or in ways that prevent nuanced, complex, and more fluid understandings 
(Banks & Banks, 2004). Eck (2000) has further documented that throughout 
U.S. history, such faiths as Islam, Hinduism, and Buddhism and their atten-
dant practices have been depicted as strange, exotic, and uncivilized.
The Case of Refugees
While further research is needed with regard to how migrants generally and 
refugees in particular negotiate religion in U.S. schools, within the general 
migrant population I believe that refugees constitute a case worthy of particular 
attention by liberals. This is so for two reasons. The first concerns adherence to 
international refugee law, which depends on a commitment to human rights, and 
therein is of basic interest to liberals. The second concerns patterns of height-
ened religiosity within diasporic groups owing to factors related to the forced 
migration experience, and an intrinsic relationship religiosity has to integration 
processes. Other types of migrants of course also qualify for this discussion, 
inasmuch as U.S. immigration policy is informed by liberal principles, and reli-
gion plays a key role in their integration patterns and processes as well. However, 
refugees, vis-à-vis both the policy structures that significantly define and guide 
their lives and their unique circumstances and integration processes serve as a 
rather “heightened” case. To demonstrate the above points, in what follows I 
provide a brief historical overview of refugee definitions and policy and then 
examine the role of religion in migrant integration processes.
In the years immediately following the World War II, the United Nations 
began preparation for what would eventually become the central interna-
tional instrument used in the determination of refugee status today. In 1949, 
and again in 1950, a UN ad hoc committee on Stateless and Related Problems 
met and reviewed a draft convention regarding refugees, submitted by then 
Secretary-General Trygve Lie. Between the two sessions, the UN Economic 
and Security Council reviewed and made rulings on the committee’s first 
report. The ad hoc committee then submitted a final report to the UN 
Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and Stateless 
Persons, held in Geneva in July 1951. The outcome of this was the 1951 
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (Grahl-Madsen, 1966).
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Review of the 1951 Convention’s mandate regarding refugees is critical 
toward understanding its cultural and political context, as well as subsequent 
efforts to broaden its scope. The 1951 Convention’s mandate read that refu-
gees included any person who
as a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951 and owing to a 
well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, 
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opin-
ion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to 
such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that coun-
try; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of 
his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, 
owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it. (UNHCR, 2007, p. 16)
Drawing from the above mandate, James Hathaway writes that the 1951 
Convention definition reflected two important characteristics. First, restricting 
the scope of the definition to persons fearing “persecution” because of civil or 
political status reflected a strategic conceptualization, allowing Western states to 
afford priority to protecting persons whose flight was motivated by pro-Western 
political values. This in turn worked to facilitate condemnation of Soviet bloc 
politics by maximizing the international visibility of political émigrés from the 
Soviet Union. Second, limiting the scope of mandatory international protection 
to refugees whose flight was prompted by a “pre-1951 event” within Europe 
reflected a Eurocentric focus, as it was geared specifically toward the redistribu-
tion of postwar European refugees. This in turn worked to ensure that there 
existed no binding obligation for the establishment of non-European refugee 
rights or assistance (Hathaway, 1991). Based on the above analysis, Hathaway 
concludes that the 1951 Convention ultimately resulted in an “incomplete and 
politically partisan human rights rationale” (8). Despite its shortcomings, the 
convention definition would stand as the internationally recognized standard 
and instrument for refugee determination for the next 16 years.
In 1967 the UN established the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees. 
Hathway (1991) writes that the protocol was significant in that it eliminated 
the requirement that refugee claims relate to a pre-1951 event in Europe, and 
hence, expanding the scope of the convention definition to include refugees 
“from all regions of the world” (p. 10). Notwithstanding the limitations of its 
scope (as Hathaway points out), the formal universalization of refugee status 
signified by the protocol nonetheless represented a significant step in the 
direction of embracing human rights.
The United States is not party to the 1951 Convention but is signatory to the 
1967 Protocol. The present legal basis of refugee admissions to the United States 
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is the Refugee Act of 1980, which, according to the U.S. Department of State 
(USDS), “embodies the American tradition of granting refuge to diverse groups 
suffering or fearing persecution” (USDS 2001 Annual report on international 
religious freedom (2001).U.S.Department of State. 2001, p. 637). Designed to 
bring U.S. law into greater compliance with international law, an intrinsic objec-
tive of the Refugee Act involved eliminating a bias within previous U.S. refugee 
admissions that favored aliens from hostile countries of origin (Yarnold, 1990).3 
In terms of refugee definitions, the Refugee Act used one derived from the 1951 
Convention, the components of which include Article 33, which addresses the 
important principle of nonrefoulement, or restriction on removal to a country 
proven to pose a threat to life or freedom (UNHCR, 2000).
Religion and Integration
Religion has historically played a very important role in forced migration, 
both as a “push factor,” wherein people have been forced to leave their home 
countries due to persecution because of their particular faith, and as a “pull 
factor,” wherein people have fled to countries where they can practice their 
faith without fear of persecution (Musalo, 2004; Van Hear, 1998). Indeed, the 
contemporary refugee protection regime itself arose out of the failure of the 
international community to offer protection to Jewish victims of the Holocaust 
(Musalo, 2004). However, religion has played an additional role in the phe-
nomenon of migration more generally, namely, to assist migrants in their 
integration to the host country. Perhaps nowhere has this been more the case 
than within the United States.
The possibility that a factor of cultural particularism (religion) may be 
related to successful integration within rather than isolation from U.S. main-
stream society stands contrary to a prevailing view within the native born 
population. This view basically holds that the assertion of a distinct ethnic 
identity and culture among migrants undermines national unity and the pres-
ervation of the nation’s culture (Portes & Rumbaut, 2006). Adherents to this 
type of reasoning within the liberal tradition (i.e., identifying with one’s par-
ticular ethnocultural group stands in opposition to embracing a “common” 
civic identity) are well known and were made particularly popular during the 
cultural wars of the 1980s and early 1990s. For instance, Allan Bloom’s (1987) 
Closing of the American Mind, and Authur Schlesinger’s (1992) The Disuniting 
of America, captured the public’s imagination and served as rallying points for 
a (re)assertion of (a particular version of) a united civic identity. Yet drawing 
on extensive empirical research, Alejandro Portes and Rumbaut Rumbaut 
write that religion most commonly accompanies the process of migration by 
ameliorating the traumas of departure and early settlement, protecting 
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migrants from external attacks and discrimination, and smoothing their accul-
turation to the new environment. They assert that this significance of religion 
is not hard to understand, as it sustains moral cohesion and normative controls 
(and hence powers against the danger of anomie, in the Durkheimian sense) 
and is consistent with the key role of religious conviction and religious cha-
risma in guiding human action and assisting important change processes as 
investigated most famously by Max Weber (Portes & Rumbaut, 2006). Thus, 
Portes and Rumbaut write that arguably the “most important role” of religion 
in migrant communities is “the development of ethnic communities and the 
reassertion of national cultures and language” (p. 304). As they summarize, 
the road to successful integration “has commonly passed through the creation 
of ethnic communities and the reenactment of elements of the migrants’ cul-
ture, with strong religious undertones” (p. 304, italics added).
Religion may be of particular importance to refugees in their resettlement 
and integration processes at the individual and communal levels. Significantly, 
refugees may well have experienced multiple levels of psychological trauma, 
occurring not only prearrival but at the transit and postarrival stages as well 
(Centre for Refugee Studies, 2008). As above, religion serves to ameliorate 
trauma among migrants generally. For refugees, however, religion may 
additionally help them in coping with trauma tied specifically to the forced 
migration experience (e.g., witnessing the murder of family and/or friends, 
being tortured, being raped, losing the entirety of ones possessions, and 
livelihood). Studies in fact have found significant associations between 
religiosity and psychosocial adaptation processes among refugee groups 
(Stoll & Johnson, 2007; Westermeyer & Nugent, 1994).
Second, faith-based organizations in the United States have had a long his-
tory of working with the government in resettling refugees (Nawyn, 2006; 
Nichols, 1988), and this pattern continues today. For instance, the list of agen-
cies participating in the U.S. Refugee Admissions Reception and Placement 
Program in financial year 2007-2008 included Church World Service, Episcopal 
Migration Ministries, Hebrew Migrant Aid Society, Lutheran Immigration and 
Refugee Service, the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, and World 
Relief (USDS, 2007).4 Nawyn finds that as faith-based Voluntary Resettlement 
Agency (VOLAGs) are more embedded than are Mutual Assistance 
Associations (MAAs) in the social welfare system, they are bound to exclu-
sively secular service provision. On the other hand, she finds that MAAs are 
more firmly planted in migrant culture, maintain more distant or indirect rela-
tions to the state, and, as a consequence, can and often do use religion to build 
migrant communities (Nawyn, 2006). Yet Nawyn also finds that religion does 
operate significantly within the faith-based VOLAG community, though it 
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does so differently than for MAAs. For faith-based VOLAGs, religion serves 
as a motivational factor for conducting their services (e.g. resettlement as 
divinely mandated service), and for MAAs it serves as a force for community 
mobilizing and community building.
Nawyn’s analysis regarding the roles of nongovernmental organizations in 
refugee resettlement reveals that MAA efforts of community building through 
rather than circumventing around ethnicity reflect a very natural process of inte-
gration for first-generation migrants. This again is substantiated by empirical 
research. For instance, Zhou, Bankstong, and Kim (2002) studied how during the 
1980s a Buddhist temple constructed by Laotian refugees in New Iberia, Louisiana, 
served as a site that empowered them with a renewed sense of pride and place in 
the United States. Furthermore, as the temple grew financially, it became a sup-
port place for those in search of employment as well as housing loans.
Finally, it is important to note that the significance of religion to adaptation 
does not stop with the first generation, although the dynamics change. Portes 
and Rumbaut (2006) for instance write that “selective acculturation,” under-
stood as the process by which second-generation children learn the language 
and culture of the host society while preserving elements of their parents’ cul-
ture, offers the best way to ward off challenges to successful adaptation and 
educational achievement (p. 316). Religion plays a key role in this process, as 
continual observance of parents’ faith proffers benefits associated with selective 
acculturation, including a common set of meanings as well as more open chan-
nels of communication between the two generations, and a system of beliefs and 
norms “antithetical to downward assimilation” (p. 316).5 According to their 
Children of Migrants Longitudinal Study (CILS-III), Portes and Rumbaut con-
clude that, with other predictors taken into account, being a member of an estab-
lished religion is “strongly and positively associated” with higher educational 
achievement and higher occupational prestige and that it is “significantly and 
negatively related” to incidents of downward assimilation (p. 323). Given the 
above, Portes and Rumbaut do point out that the evidence cautions against a 
“too-uniform or too-celebratory” account of the role of religion (p. 331). As they 
write, not all first- or second-generation migrants follow the path of embracing 
their heritage religions as a means of integrating into the host society.
Discussion of Liberal Concerns and the Applicability of 
Will Kymlicka’s Framework to the Issues
The school problems and issues I discuss reflect questions of fundamental 
concern to liberals. Discussion of these questions, however, does not at all 
assume uniformity within the liberal tradition. Certainly there exist points 
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where liberals differ. Yet it is reasonable to assert that liberals are preoccupied 
with many of the same basic questions, including the definition, level of 
importance, and operation of liberty and freedom, individualism and auton-
omy, tolerance, justice, and what it means to live the good life (Gutmann, 
1987; Merry, 2007; Tozer, Violas, & Senese, 1995). In this sense, the 
problems and issues I discuss do speak to such matters. That the United States 
remains an overwhelmingly Christian nation and that there are inherent 
complications to assertions of “culturally neutrality” in the civic sphere raise 
questions across the constructs mentioned above. These questions take sharper 
focus when applied to the educational issues. For instance, how can teachers 
understand the concept of tolerance if they lack understanding of their stu-
dents’ cultures and cultural backgrounds? By what right can schools advance 
conceptions of student autonomy if they deny significant aspects of how stu-
dents conceive their own identity? What consequences do essentialized and 
static notions of culture have for students’ sense of freedom?
To be fair, many liberal concerns regarding religion and the schools are, at 
least by law, addressed by the schools through the Establishment and Free 
Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.6 Briefly, 
the Establishment Clause is used primarily to challenge state advancement or 
endorsement of a religion, reflecting Thomas Jefferson’s famous “wall of 
separation” metaphor. Lawsuits under the Free Exercise Clause in turn typi-
cally focus on secular government regulations allegedly having a coercive 
effect on religious practices (Cambron-McCabe et al., 2004). Cambron-
McCabe et al. write that as establishment case issues involve the legality of 
governmental actions and free exercise cases involve claims of governmental 
secular practices burdening religious exercise, they represent poles on a spec-
trum that must be balanced to maintain the constitutionality of governmental 
practices. Difficult church–state controversies involve competing claims 
under the two clauses, as both are cast in absolute terms, “either of which, if 
expanded to a logical extreme, would tend to clash with the other” (p. 28).7 
Though it is fair to conclude that the Supreme Court has worked to protect 
liberal principles regarding church–state relations in the public schools, 
Cambron-McCabe et al. write that the principle of wholesale governmental 
neutrality toward religion demanded by the First Amendment has been easier 
to assert than to apply. Second, the vast majority of court cases involving 
church–state relations in the schools pertain to Christianity (Cambron-
McCabe et al., 2004). This is of course consonant with the fact that 78.4% of 
Americans are Christian (Pew Research Center, 2008). However, the discrep-
ancy may also be due at least in part to the relative lack of social and political 
power on the behalf of minority religion migrant groups.
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Polyethnicity and Polyethnic Group Rights
In what follows, I situate my discussion of migrant minority religions and the 
public schools within Kymlicka’s framework regarding polyethnicity and 
polyethnic group rights, and I focus on refugees as a particular case for anal-
ysis. Where warranted, the discussion includes attention to some of the major 
detractors to Kymlicka’s line of thought, his response, and analysis of his 
response in light of the article’s focus.
One of the most interesting, albeit basic connections that may initially be 
drawn between Kymlicka’s framework and the discussion concerns the very 
recognition of a polyethnic group. Put simply, naming a group as such puts them 
on the map, and from the literature it would appear that many of the groups in 
question are simply “off the map” for a great number of teachers who teach 
them. This is rather simple of course, but it also represents the most essential 
starting point for any possibility of connecting these ideas to actual school poli-
cies and practices. Migrants may suffer from a lack of understanding of their 
particular faith background from their teachers, school administrative and lead-
ership staff, and their peers, and it would seem that the notion of a “polyethnic 
group” might serve as a starting point for deeper and more extensive learning. 
As Casey (2008) writes, knowledge about the religious needs and requirements 
of students advances understanding between the school and the family and “pre-
pares teachers and school administrators for questions when they arise” (p. 41). 
This being said, of course, there are many ways in which groups might be iden-
tified, and polyethnicity is but one construct within which to position and con-
ceptualize a multiple number of ethnic groups existing in the larger society.
However, beginning the discussion here with the notion of “polyethnic” 
also allows for examining the degree to which refugees might properly fit 
within the framework. Kymlicka by and large writes about polyethnic rights 
as pertaining to immigrants. Refugees, however, represent a special type of 
migrant as they do not leave their home countries voluntarily, and for 
Kymlicka, questions concerning the possibility of their return to their home-
lands as well as determining which country should redress the injustices they 
have experienced complicate neatly identifying these groups as polyethnic 
groups (Kymlicka, 1995). As Kymlicka writes, “The best that refugees can 
realistically expect is to be treated as immigrants, with the corresponding 
polyethnic rights, and hope to return to their homeland as quickly as possi-
ble” (p. 99). However, inasmuch as the framework is concerned with facili-
tating liberal ends, it would appear that greater attention needs to be given to 
the very reason refugees enter the United States in the first place (or any other 
state signatory to the said conventions for that matter). Notwithstanding its 
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limitations, as discussed, the 1967 Protocol embodies fundamental liberal 
principles, and refugees seek refuge precisely to realize them. In many cases, 
access to their respective societal cultures is intrinsically connected to 
this; the Iraqi woman whose life is threatened for practicing her Christian 
faith, the Chinese man whose Buddhist practice is perceived as insurrection. 
Though it is certainly true that such cases as these may be individually based, 
they are also commonly characteristic of refugee ethnic groups.8 More so, as 
noted earlier, refugees may exhibit a heightened sense of religiosity in 
association with their psychosocial adaptation to their new country, and this 
provides a further rationale for securing a right to their culture. Finally, 
reflecting the fine line between voluntary and forced migration, refugee com-
munities very often become long-term communities because of protracted 
instability in their homelands and/or the new opportunities they have found 
in the host society (Castles & Miller, 2003). This raises the issue of relation-
ship between citizenship and polyethnic rights. Though a fuller discussion of 
the issue is outside the bounds of this article, generally I believe that formal 
citizenship should not be an insurmountable obstacle toward migrants 
enjoying the kinds of rights Kymlicka is discussing. Arguably, some of the 
most fundamental needs for access to a societal culture occur in the initial 
years of resettlement and are not timed to the number of resident years 
required for citizenship qualification in the United States.
The next level of connecting polyethnicity and polyethnic group rights to 
the discussion concerns the issue of denying migrants their religion and culture, 
above and beyond the issue of simply being unaware of these things. This is 
perhaps where the strongest case can be made for asserting a right to culture as 
a means toward facilitating individual freedom and individual autonomy. To 
review the argument, freedom and culture are intimately related, as culture and, 
specifically, “societal culture” is deeply connected to individuals’ freedom of 
choice. A societal culture provides its members, in both the public and private 
spheres, with meaningful ways of life across the full range of human activities 
(social, religious, economic, educational, recreational, etc.). Hence, societal 
cultures provide the options of choices for individuals, the meanings attached 
to such options, and the lens through which individual members identify their 
experiences as valuable (Kymlicka, 1995). Kymlicka asserts that in as much as 
liberals are concerned with protecting individual freedom of choice, they must 
also be concerned, at least to a certain degree, with protecting the societal cul-
tures within which individuals realize this freedom.
As earlier referenced, many liberal detractors to this association between 
freedom and culture argue that a system of universal rights already accommo-
dates cultural differences by allowing people the freedom to associate with 
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others in pursuit of shared religious or ethnic practices (Kymlicka, 1995). 
Giving political recognition or support to particular cultural practices is thought 
to be unnecessary because the “cultural marketplace” will operate on its own to 
attract adherents, and unfair, because it “subsidizes some people’s choices at 
the expense of others” (p. 107). On this view, the state should remain detached 
from the cultural marketplace altogether and should refrain from either pro-
moting or inhibiting the maintenance of any particular culture. Instead, it 
should respond with a kind of “benign neglect” to national and ethnic differ-
ences. However, Kymlicka counters that this “strict separation of state and eth-
nicity” view is both mistaken and actually incoherent, as the state “unavoidably 
promotes certain cultural identities” (p. 108). Though Kymlicka acknowledges 
that the majority of Americans do participate in a common culture defined by a 
modern, secular and industrialized civilization, he asserts that there also exists 
a dominant culture, whose members benefit from certain privileges promoted 
by the state through such things as government decisions on languages, internal 
boundaries, public holidays, and state symbols. Hence, lest one were to deny 
that such things as the English language and Christmas had any reference to a 
specific culture, the benign neglect view simply makes no sense. Kymlicka’s 
argument is not so much to eliminate the majority nation’s language and soci-
etal culture (although he does have some suggested changes), but rather, in the 
name of fairness, to extend the same benefits and opportunities to certain 
minority groups, including polyethnic groups.
Given that the United States still remains an overwhelmingly Christian 
nation and given the disproportionate amount of power Christians have in 
influencing policy making in U.S. schools, the argument for affording poly-
ethnic rights in the name of equality seems only fair. These rights simply 
addresses the concern that ethnic groups be provided equal access to the 
mainstream culture(s) as the dominant culture and also similar supports 
already enjoyed by the members of the dominant culture. Read in the context 
of public school accommodations for religious identities and religious 
expressions, polyethnic rights provide a basis for recognizing that minority 
religions may involve group, and not only individualized expression, but 
also, reflecting this, equal opportunities to engage in silent prayer, observe 
religious holidays, participate in symbolic religious expressions (e.g. wear-
ing of hijab by Muslim girls, or the kirpan of Sikh boys), form religious 
groups, and be exempt from certain secular activities. Though this is not a 
finite list, it should be viewed as one comprising some of the key areas often 
discussed with regard to religious accommodations. Furthermore, from the 
research, it would seem that refugees represent a sort of “flagship commu-
nity” for migrants’ rights here, inasmuch as access to their societal cultures 
may be particularly germane to their integration processes.
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Second, and this goes back to earlier points made regarding the very recogni-
tion of a polyethnic group, Kymlicka’s argument for polyethnic rights in the 
name of diversity addresses the potential that ethnic groups have to contributing 
to diversity within the majority culture. Again, read in the context of public 
school accommodations for religious identities and religious expressions, poly-
ethnic rights provide a basis for equal opportunities to inform such things as 
religious displays and holiday observations. Perhaps more fundamentally, how-
ever, polyethnic rights afforded in this area provide a rationale for including in 
the curriculum knowledge about a spectrum of religions. Teaching about reli-
gion (as distinct from teaching in religion) in fact serves a very liberal purpose, 
namely, to expose students to differing perspectives. For instance, Cambron-
McCabe et al. (2004) write that although the proselytization of students by pub-
lic school teachers violates the Establishment Clause, “the Supreme Court has 
emphasized that it is permissible, even desirable, to teach the Bible and other 
religious documents from a literary, cultural, or historical perspective” (p. 40).
Finally, the findings of Portes and Rumbaut and others appear to provide 
empirical support, if not justification, for Kymlicka’s argument for polyeth-
nic rights, in as much as polyethnic rights are seen as a way of protecting and 
advancing the most effective ways in which migrants actually and already 
integrate. As discussed, religion has been shown to facilitate rather than 
obstruct migrant integration, and the resettlement infrastructure in the United 
States, particularly where Mutual Aid Associations are concerned, appears to 
reflect this. Furthermore, Kymlicka notes that since the 1970s the United 
States, similar to Canada and Australia, has rejected the assimilationist model 
of immigration policy and has become more tolerant and pluralistic in accept-
ing the freedom of migrants to maintain aspects of their native cultures.
Much of the preceding discussion has been concerned with matching 
empirical research regarding the integration processes of immigrant and refu-
gee communities, with a liberal framework that speaks to certain problems 
they have experienced in schools. However, as earlier mentioned, the article 
is not an argument for religiosity or religious expression, or a statement that 
migrants must necessarily have a religion to effectively integrate, or an argu-
ment that religion is a vital component of migrant’s identity. Indeed, I believe 
the central liberal question the article concerns itself with is precisely the 
freedom to which students may or may not identify with or be identified with 
a cultural group, including that group’s religion. This raises some of the more 
difficult questions with respect to applying the framework.
Though liberal assimilationist views that crusade against cultural particu-
larism weaken considerably in light of Kymlicka’s (1995) argument regard-
ing the problem with “benign neglect,” the question about the degree to 
which a group might promote group rights over the rights of the individual is 
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a serious one. Kymlicka addresses this by asserting that a liberal view also 
requires freedom within the minority group, and this is secured by a protec-
tion against internal restrictions, or “demands by the minority culture to 
restrict the basic civil or political liberties of its own members” (p. 152). A 
troubling dilemma here is reconciling how freedom and equality within 
migrant cultures may be ensured, without imposing such liberal values onto 
migrant cultures (and hence compromising equality between groups). 
Kymlicka’s argument that polyethnic rights are meant to facilitate integration 
and that most migrants want to integrate in part addresses this issue, inas-
much as integration entails fulfilling a desire for inclusion. However, his 
stronger defense is that liberals work to “compel respect” for liberal princi-
ples amongst newly arrived migrant groups.
Compelling respect for liberal principles among some groups is, however, 
easier said than done. Indeed, some migrant groups may revert to forms of 
religious fundamentalism as a response to conditions perceived as a threat to 
their traditional cultural identities (Castles & Miller, 2003). This can polarize 
relationships between parents and their children, wherein the former attempt to 
instill in their young traditional cultural values and the latter try to create new 
identities that may incorporate not only traditional cultural practices but also 
practices learned in the host society (Collet, 2007). Here, group-differentiated 
rights may run the risk of giving greater license to parents to exert influence on 
the school toward providing religious accommodations, even at the expense of 
compromising the autonomy of their daughters and sons. As Casey (2008) 
writes, included in the religious freedoms guaranteed by our Constitution is the 
freedom for individuals to determine whether they want to be religious. 
Concomitantly, inasmuch as societal cultures are dynamic and change, schools 
that advance static or essentialized representations of migrant cultures (either 
through the curriculum or through other forms of school discourse) also run the 
risk of undermining the choices students have to freely form and pursue a con-
ception of the good, and potentially as well their ability to critically distance 
themselves from their inherited cultures. For refugee students, the school as a 
site of refuge must be a site of liberty in every sense of the term.
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Sorting out the appropriate relationship between religion and public schooling 
has never been as easy as the simple assertion of separation of church and state 
would imply (Haynes, 2009). In Sites of Refuge: Refugees, Religiosity, and 
Public Schools in the United States, Bruce Collet uses the concept of polyeth-
nic group rights (Kymlicka, 1995) to make the case for accommodating the 
religious identities and religious expressions of immigrant and refugee stu-
dents in public schools. He argues that, as “sites of refuge” where religious 
identities can be expressed, schools have the potential to play an important 
part in supporting integration processes of immigrants and refugees. The arti-
cle centers on the extraordinary circumstances of forced migration and a rec-
ognition of the importance of religion in the lives of forced migrants, to make 
the case for religious accommodation in what are ostensibly secular public 
schools. The overarching concern of the article is with processes of integra-
tion. The claim is that “by guaranteeing the right to their societal culture, poly-
ethnic rights comprise a viable framework for supporting immigrants and 
refugees in their integration into the United States” (Collet, 2010, p.2). The 
case is clearly presented, well argued, and compelling and makes a significant 
contribution to ongoing policy discussions regarding an historically thorny 
but increasingly timely issue. That said, my intention in this rejoinder is to 
shift the discussion somewhat from school-as-refuge to school-as-polis and to 
ask whether the integration interests of recent immigrants and refugees might 
not be better served by a more inclusive approach to religiosity in schools that 
is less about collective exception and more about social transformation.
The Case for Exception: Public School as Refuge
One way (perhaps the most common way) of interpreting the state commit-
ment to educational “neutrality” is to imagine schools as religion-free zones. 
To hold this view requires one to ignore the overwhelmingly Christian 
dimensions of mainstream cultural contexts in the United States and to set 
aside the obviously Christian origins of definitions of the school week and 
indeed the school year. Nonetheless, there are many who insist that liberalism 
and secularism demand that constraints and limitations be placed on the 
expression of religious identity in schools. Contrary to this view, Collet 
argues that for purposes of integration, exceptions to the “necessary con-
straints” on religious expression should be made for refugees. He bases this 
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argument on the recognition, supported by extensive empirical research, of 
the centrality of religion for many people in migration and postmigration 
experiences. Not only does religion help to ameliorate trauma but it often 
plays a central role in resettlement and community building. This is not to say 
that Collet is indifferent to the larger project of social transformation. Indeed, 
citing Kymlicka, he makes the point that the very recognition of a polyethnic 
group “addresses the potential that ethnic groups have to contributing to 
diversity within the majority culture” (Collet, 2010, p. 24). Nor does it imply 
that there are not good reasons to recognize the unique circumstances of ref-
ugees and forced migrants. Rather my question is whether it might not be a 
better strategy to focus less on the extraordinary situation of the refugee—“a 
sort of ‘flagship community’ for migrants rights” (Collet, 2010, p. 24)—and 
place more emphasis on the benefits of an enlarged vision of more inclusive 
schools and a more inclusive society.
The Case for Transformation: Public School as Polis
Another perhaps less common way of interpreting the state commitment to 
educational “neutrality” is to imagine schools that allow for the expression of 
many religions rather than none (or just one). This shift enables us to think 
about the religion of the refugee not as something that requires an “exemp-
tion” from the principle of school neutrality but rather as something that 
makes an important contribution to religious liberty, inclusivity, and pluralism 
both in the school and in the larger society. Such a position emphasizes inter-
action and engagement as an important component of integration. It sees inte-
gration not as a one-way process whereby forced migrants and refugees learn 
to adapt to the meanings, values, and practices of the dominant culture. 
Instead, integration through interaction and engagement is about making new 
common meanings, values, and practices and transforming dominant cultures. 
In describing Hannah Arendt’s conception of the “democratic person,” Gert 
Biesta (2007) sets out an interesting description of the public sphere rich in 
implications for how we think about the place of religiosity in schools. Talking 
about subjectivity as a quality of human action and interaction, Biesta writes,
While we could refer to Arendt’s position as a social conception of 
subjectivity—Arendt argues, after all, that we cannot be a subject in 
isolation—I prefer to call it a political conception. The main reason for 
this is that Arendt holds that my subjectivity is only possible in 
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the situation in which others can be subjects as well. Not any social 
situation will therefore do. In those situations in which we try to  
control the responses of others or deprive others of the opportunity to 
begin, we cannot come into the world either, our subjectivity is not a 
possibility. Arendt relates subjectivity, in other words, to the life of the 
polis, the public sphere where we live—and have to live—with others 
who are not like us. It is here that we can see the link between Arendt’s 
political conception of subjectivity and the idea of democracy, in that 
democracy can precisely be understood as the situation in which every-
one has the opportunity to be a subject, in which everyone has the 
opportunity to act and, through their actions, bring their beginnings and 
initiatives into the world of difference and plurality. (Biesta, 2007, p. 8)
Bringing the conversation back to the question of school policy, could the 
polis be an appropriate metaphor for thinking about religiosity and public 
schooling? The Ontario Ministry of Education apparently thinks so and has 
recently produced a policy document entitled “Realizing the Promise of 
Diversity: Ontario’s Equity and Inclusive Education Strategy” (Ontario Min-
istry of Education, 2009). The document is premised on an assumption of 
difference and plurality and a recognition that schools are indeed public 
spheres where we have to learn to live with others who are not like us. The 
document begins by defining three core concepts:
Diversity: The presence of a wide range of human qualities and attri-
butes within a group, organization, or society. The dimensions of diver-
sity include, but are not limited to, ancestry, culture, ethnicity, gender, 
gender identity, language, physical and intellectual ability, race, reli-
gion, sex, sexual orientation, and socio-economic status. (p. 4)
Equity: A condition or state of fair, inclusive, and respectful treat-
ment of all people. Equity does not mean treating people the same 
without regard for individual differences. (p. 4)
Inclusive Education: Education that is based on the principles of 
acceptance and inclusion of all students. Students see themselves 
reflected in their curriculum, their physical surroundings, and the 
broader environment, in which diversity is honoured and all individu-
als are respected. (p. 4)
The document sets out a vision of an inclusive education system (p. 10), 
describes the guiding principles that are to inform the inclusive education 
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strategy (p. 11), and establishes leadership, policy, and accountability as core 
priorities (p. 12). The framework is comprehensive and intended to address 
the range of socially constituted significant human differences. With respect 
to religious difference, the strategy directs every school board in Ontario to 
“have religious accommodation guidelines in place, and communicate these 
guidelines to the school community” by 2009-2010 (p. 21). The Toronto Dis-
trict School Board (n.d.) is singled out in the strategy document as a board 
whose “policies embed the principles of fairness, equity, and inclusive edu-
cation and include comprehensive guidelines for religious accommodation 
designed to ensure that students and staff can observe the tenets of their faith 
free from harassment or discrimination” (p. 16).
The “Guidelines and Procedures for Religious Accommodations” of the 
Toronto District School Board (Toronto District School Board, n.d.) begin 
by outlining the legislative and policy context within which the guidelines 
and procedures have been developed (not unlike the American Constitu-
tion’s First Amendment commitment to “free exercise”):
The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms protects freedom of reli-
gion. The Ontario Human Rights Code protects an individual’s freedom 
from discriminatory or harassing behaviour based on religion. (p. 1)
The Ontario Human Rights Policy Guidelines on Creed and the 
Accommodation of Religious Observances defines accommodation as 
a duty corresponding to the right to be free from discrimination. (p. 2)
The duty to accommodate applies to students and staff in Toronto schools 
and covers areas that include but are not limited to observation of major reli-
gious holy days and celebrations, school opening or closing exercises, prayer, 
dietary requirements, fasting, religious attire, modesty requirements in physi-
cal education, and participation in daily activities and curriculum (p. 4). The 
document makes clear that the duty to accommodate is not absolute—that 
accommodations apply to individuals and not to whole classes or to class-
room practices in general and that the board cannot accommodate religious 
values and beliefs that conflict with the Ontario Human Rights Code or with 
board policies (p. 8). That said, the Guidelines and Procedures are intended 
to support a flexible and commonsense approach to dealing with questions of 
religion and schooling and express the hope that a commitment to accom-
modation and dialogue with members of diverse religious communities “will 
help to build an environment of mutual respect and understanding” (p. 1).
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A policy does not make a community harmonious. Still, it does provide a 
place to turn for support for activities and initiatives that might make school-
ing more inclusive, more participatory, and, in Arendt’s formulation, more 
democratic. As George Dei puts it,
Inclusion is not bringing people into what already exists; it is making 
a new space, a better space for everyone. (Dei, 2006, cited in Ontario 
Ministry of Education, 2009, p. 2)
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Notes
1. Kymlicka’s (1995) working definition of “culture” in Multicultural Citizenship 
focuses specifically on the kind of multiculturalism arising from national and 
ethnic differences. He writes that he is using the term “a culture” as synonymous 
with “a ‘nation’ or ‘a people’,” or as “an intergenerational community, more or 
less institutionally complete, occupying a given territory or homeland, sharing a 
distinct language and history” (p. 18).
2. Regarding this case, Cambron-McCabe, McCarthy, & Thomas (2008) write that by 
2007 the standards had been changed four times, reflecting a series of power shifts at 
the board.
3. Countries deemed hostile at the time of the act’s passage would have included 
those with communist, socialist, and leftist forms of government. The degree to which 
the United States has been fully compliant with the objective of eliminating political 
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bias has however been questioned by legal scholars. For instance, in her analysis 
of asylum-related appeals between 1980 and 1987, Barbara Yarnold found that 
the hostile country bias in refugee admissions had been perpetuated—and even 
intensified—through policy implementation by agencies within the immigration 
bureaucracy. See Barbara Yarnold (1990), “Administrative Policy Making: Adju-
dication by the Board of Immigration Appeals in Asylum-Related Appeals 1980-
1987,” Policy Studies Review, 9(4), 681-701.
4. The other agencies participating in financial year 2007-2008 included Ethiopian 
Community Development Council, Iowa Bureau of Refugee Services, International 
Rescue Committee, and the U.S. Committee for Refugees and Migrants (U.S. Depart-
ment of State, 2007).
5. Portes and Rumbaut discuss “downward assimilation” as reflecting cases where 
learning the cultural ways of the host society leads to downward rather than 
upward mobility (p. 264).
6. As education is primarily a state and not a federal function, most church–state 
school controversies have been initiated through the Fourteenth Amendment, 
which incorporates First Amendment guarantees. Cambron-McCabe et al. (2004) 
state that the Fourteenth Amendment, adopted in 1868, “specifically placed restric-
tions on state action impairing personal rights” (p. 25, italics in the original).
7. In full, Cambron-McCabe et al. (2004) write:
Whereas the Establishment Clause is used primarily to challenge governmen-
tal advancement of religion, lawsuits under the Free Exercise Clause usually 
focus on secular (nonreligious) government regulations alleged to have a 
coercive effect on religious practices. In establishment cases, the legality of 
the governmental action itself is at issue, but in free exercise claims, individu-
als often accept the secular nature of government regulation but assert that it 
burdens their religious exercise. . . . To evaluate free exercise claims, the judi-
ciary traditionally applied a balancing test including an assessment of whether 
practices dictated by a sincere and legitimate religious belief were impeded by 
the governmental action, and if so, to what extent. (p. 27)
8. That the current global refuge rights regime established by the 1951 Convention 
and 1967 Protocol is perhaps closest to the fundamental tenets of liberalism it 
is has ever been should not detract attention from the fact that criteria estab-
lishing a “well-founded fear” are very often rooted in ethnic group identity and 
that targeted U.S. refugee policies very often take the form of large or semilarge 
ethnic group resettlements. In the first case, the convention persecution criteria 
of race and religion directly relate to ethnicity, as very often does criteria relat-
ing to nationality (for instance, Bosnian or Rwandan refugees; UNHCR, 2000). 
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Furthermore, refugee claims to persecution regarding “membership of a particu-
lar social group” often intersect with ethnic factors (for instance, persecution of 
women; UNHCR, 2000). In the second case, group-based access comprises one 
of the three broad categories of refugee admissions to the United States (the other 
two are individual case referrals and family-based access), and refugee groups 
here are often (also) ethnic groups (for instance, the Somali Bantu ethnic group 
or Iranian religious minorities).
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